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In recent years it has become increasingly evident that globalization and identity
operate in some kind of dialectic between ﬂow and closure (Meyer and Geschiere,
1999), with the contradictory expansions of modernity producing an accelerated
desire for interconnecting individuals, groups and ‘their’ territories, and for ﬁrmly
rooting such triads in global space. Arguably constituting the ﬂip-side of globali-
zation (Geschiere, 2009), this process has entailed the resurgence of local identities,
vernacular forms of autochthonous exclusions as well as the proliferation of ‘indig-
enous peoples’ all over the globe. Celebrated by some as, at last, the necessary
political recognition of cultural diﬀerence, others have been less optimistic about
the eﬀects of this expansive identity politics that has emerged as the uneasy com-
panion of the seemingly dated ideal of equality within liberal and avowedly
‘modern’ states.
Within anthropology, these divisions have recently crystallized in a debate fol-
lowing Adam Kuper’s provocative criticism of the notion of ‘indigeneity’ in his
article ‘The return of the native’ (2003), which generated varied responses pub-
lished in Current Anthropology 44(3), 45(2), Anthropology Today 20(2), 20(5) and
Social Anthropology 14(1). Kuper strongly argues against ‘indigenous people’ as
both an anthropological concept and a political tool for activists, claiming that this
phrase, ﬁrst, is based on obsolete anthropological notions of ‘primitive society’ and
essentializations of culture; second, ultimately makes use of ‘the Nuremberg prin-
ciple’ of descent despite all its rhetoric of ‘culture’; and, third, in its application
creates new divisions, while being less likely to promote the common good than are
policies evoking individual rights of citizens within liberal-democratic states.
The discussion that ensued focused, among others, on the question whether
‘indigeneity’ should be principally rejected because of its cultural essentialism,
deconstructed within contemporary anthropology, or whether its ‘strategic essen-
tialism’ (Spivak, 1988) should be politically endorsed in order to pragmatically
improve the living conditions of marginalized groups. Alan Barnard’s contribution
to this debate is a case in point, arguing that when freeing the idea of ‘indigenous
people’ from its ‘old-fashioned associations with the ‘‘primitive’’ and the ‘‘perpet-
ual’’ ’, it can be a useful legal tool for political persuasion, even though it is not a
meaningful category for ethnographic description and analysis as ‘there is no, and
can be no, theoretically-unproblematic anthropological deﬁnition of ‘‘indigenous’’ ’
(Barnard, 2006: 10, 8).
Thus, while endorsing the political usage of ‘indigeneity’, Barnard does share
Kuper’s conviction about the principal grounds for the theoretical inappropriate-
ness of the term. It is interesting to note that various contributors to the subsequent
discussion of Barnard’s article in the same issue of Social Anthropology 14(1)
equally seem to regard ‘indigeneity’ as an inadequate theoretical concept. Most
of these writers diﬀer merely in either supporting (Guenther, 2006; Thuen, 2006) or
rejecting (Kuper, 2006; Wolfe, 2006) Barnard’s proposed double-bind of politico-
legally propagating, while analytically deconstructing, ‘indigenous peoples’. Yet
two contributions by Justin Kenrick (2006) and by Evie Plaice (2006) do also
point toward the possibility, if not necessity, of re-evaluating the apparent
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theoretical poverty of the contested term within anthropology. As Plaice succinctly
puts it:
I am not convinced that the separation Barnard suggests [between politico-legal use-
fulness and theoretical inappropriateness of the notion of ‘indigenous peoples’] is
either practical or desirable. And if it is, I would argue the reverse: that the term
and the discussion of it belong in anthropology, and not in law unless its meaning and
application are supported by academic and intellectual discussion. (2006: 2)
In this article, I follow this path suggested by Plaice in providing a fresh look at
the theoretical potential of the concept of ‘indigeneity’ as well as of several other
identity-related notions within anthropology. I do so by generally exploring the
theoretical interrelations between a bunch of terms that are often evoked together,
yet rarely presented within a synthesized model, namely ‘autochthony’, ‘ethnicity’,
‘indigeneity’ and ‘nationalism’. I thereby proceed through bringing into dialogue
two crucial bodies of literature – studies of nationalism, on the one hand, and of
autochthony, on the other – which have engaged surprisingly little with each other
conceptually and instead provided rather contradictory accounts as to how identity
formations of individuals and groups literally ‘take place’: within studies of nation-
alism, it is typically the ‘non-ethnic’ (the ‘civic’) that is associated with territory
through place of birth and/or residence (the ‘ethnic’ being mainly linked to descent
and culture), whereas in research on autochthony, it is usually the ‘ethnic’ that
legitimizes privileged access to territory through ‘ﬁrst-comer claims’ rooted in
the past.
Against this backdrop, I argue for a synthesis of insights from both ﬁelds by
conceptualizing ‘autochthony’ – that is, the proclaimed ‘original’ link between
individual, territory and group – as the root phenomenon. I propose distinguishing
between two causal logics underlying the reproduction of this autochthony triad,
which honour time in diﬀerent ways: ‘individualized autochthony’ links the indi-
vidual, territory and group in such a way that shared culture and/or descent ulti-
mately follow from place of birth and/or residence within the same present, while
‘collectivized autochthony’ inverts this causality on the basis of continuously evok-
ing the same past. Based on this notion of autochthony envisioned as the causal
logic generally underlying ethnicity, I conclude by distinguishing between ‘indi-
geneity’ and ‘nationalism’ as alternative modes for accessing the state: indigeneity
refers to cases of autochthony that, in compensation for past discriminations by
dominant late-comers aligned with the state, demand special entitlements from this
state, whereas nationalism denotes cases of autochthony that aim for the very
entitlement of the state itself.
The civic–ethnic divide within studies of nationalism
Studies of nationalism have a long history of diﬀerentiating and analysing empir-
ical cases of nationhood and national identity according to basic classiﬁcations.
3
While some authors have developed sophisticated typologies – for instance,
Anthony D. Smith in his Theories of Nationalism (1983: 211–29) – most have
been content with using one of various root dichotomies such as ‘political-cultural’,
‘liberal-illiberal’, ‘universalistic-particularistic’, ‘inclusive-exclusive’ and so on. A
cursory list of such dichotomous distinctions provided by Philip Spencer and
Howard Wollman (2005: 199) mentions 14 such dualisms, many of which overlap.
Going back in time, the genealogy of these dichotomies notably includes an early
distinction between ‘voluntarist’ and ‘organic’ nationalisms in the late 19th century
(Smith, 2001: 36), Friedrich Meinecke’s (1919) opposition between the mainly pas-
sive Kulturnation and the rather politically active Staatsnation and – most promi-
nently perhaps – Hans Kohn’s (1944) argument during the mid 20th century
contrasting ‘western’ with ‘eastern’ forms of nationalism.
Kohn (1944), reacting against his experience of the German Third Reich, argued
that nationalism was ﬁrst developed in ‘the West’ by a strong bourgeois class in the
context of the Enlightenment as the political and rational association of citizens
pursuing their legitimate interests within a shared territory in the context of
common laws. In ‘the East’, however, nationalism developed only later and largely
in reaction to the success and conﬁdence of its ‘western’ variant. According to
Kohn, ‘eastern’ nationalism based itself on beliefs in common culture and descent,
propagating a notion of the nation as an organic, supra-individual whole that
permanently and inescapably recruited its members at birth. Emerging in a
region ruled by imperial autocrats and semi-feudal landowners, and lacking a com-
parable bourgeois class, ‘eastern’ nationalism thereby exhibited an inferiority com-
plex that proved to be dangerously susceptible to authoritarian and mystical forms
of nationalism.
Kohn’s basic distinction between ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ nationalisms has turned
out to be enormously inﬂuential within nationalism studies. Recently, this dichot-
omy has gained further prominence (not only within but also outside academia)
through a terminological distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism.
According to Smith, the ‘civic’ or western model is ‘predominantly a spatial or
territorial conception’, while the distinguishing feature of the ‘ethnic’ or non-wes-
tern nation is ‘its emphasis on a community of birth and native culture’ (Smith,
1991: 9, 11). Seen in this light, civic nationalism has typically been discussed pos-
itively as liberal, voluntarist and inclusive, while ethnic nationalism has been
viewed negatively as illiberal, organic and exclusive.
Such broad and fundamental conceptions of nationalisms – ‘East’ and ‘West,’
‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ – have not passed, of course, without criticism. Kohn’s concep-
tual regionalism has been widely criticized for being crude, grossly exaggerated and
having a somewhat neo-orientalist ﬂavor (for example, Spencer and Wollman,
2005: 200). Thus, instead of denoting whole world regions, the civic–ethnic oppo-
sition has been increasingly used as a means of diﬀerentiating concrete states.
However, as Rogers Brubaker (2004: 135) notes, many scholars of nationalism
have lately ‘grown uncomfortable with the unequivocal sorting of cases into
‘‘civic’’ and ‘‘ethnic’’ categories’ and with characterizing ‘an entire state, or an
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entire national movement, simply as civic or ethnic’. Instead, it has become, in a
way, a mainstream position within studies of nationalism to regard ‘civic’ and
‘ethnic’ primarily as ideal-type positions and to analyse – as Smith (1991: 13)
phrases it – all concrete cases as containing ‘civic and ethnic elements in varying
degrees and diﬀerent forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate;
at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized.’
Despite these more nuanced usages of the civic–ethnic divide, several observers
have highlighted the inherent analytical and normative ambiguities of this master
dichotomy. For my current purposes, Brubaker’s (2004) succinct discussion pro-
vides a satisfactory summary of the primary contentious issues. As Brubaker (2004:
136–40) shows, the civic–ethnic distinction is analytically ambiguous since both
terms can be deﬁned either broadly or narrowly, leading to fundamental problems
in the concrete application of the dichotomy: If the term ‘ethnic’ is deﬁned nar-
rowly as only rooted in (assumed) descent, too many heterogeneous cases end up
being classiﬁed as ‘civic’, while a broad notion of ‘ethnic’ as based on shared
culture leaves hardly any cases in the ‘civic’ box. Conversely, a narrow concept
of ‘civic’ as acultural, ahistorical and universalist ‘has never been instantiated’
(Brubaker, 2004: 137), whereas a broad deﬁnition also entailing a civic culture
incorporates virtually all ‘ethnic’ cases as well. Thus, combining both narrow or
both broad deﬁnitions creates a large middle ground covered either by neither or by
both ideal-types. In addition, even if a deﬁnition of the ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ could be
agreed upon, it is often very diﬃcult to decide even for single elements within a
given nation – as Brubaker convincingly shows with regard to language policies –
in which box they actually belong.
Apart from these analytical uncertainties, Brubaker’s (2004: 140–4) discussion
also shows the civic–ethnic distinction to be haunted by normative ambiguities.
As was mentioned before, ‘civic’ nationalism has typically been viewed as being
positively inclusive, whereas ‘ethnic’ nationalism has been criticized for being
dangerously exclusive. However, besides emphasizing that inclusion is nothing
inherently positive, Brubaker (2004: 141) succinctly observes that ‘in fact all
understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously
inclusive and exclusive. What varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclu-
siveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion.’
Based on this argument, Brubaker (2004: 144–6) ﬁnally argues for dissolving the
ambiguous and overburdened civic–ethnic dichotomy and suggests, alternatively,
a much more modest distinction between ‘state-framed’ and ‘counter-state’ con-
ceptions of nationhood.
While I endorse Brubaker’s criticism of the civic–ethnic divide and have advo-
cated replacing this master dichotomy by several, more nuanced, analytical dimen-
sions (Zenker, 2009), I still think that the analytical distinction between ‘civic’ and
‘ethnic’ nationalism has been valuable in enumerating most of the basic elements
that seem typically to play some role in the (re)production of ethnicity. However, as
I will argue below, these basic elements need to be conceptualized diﬀerently
with regard to their various interrelations, and for this purpose a critical discussion
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of a second body of literature, namely, the recent ethnography of autochthony,
may be instructive.
The recent ethnography of autochthony
The Oxford Dictionary of English characterizes the term ‘autochthon’ as being
derived from the Greek autos (self) and khthon (earth), literally meaning ‘sprung
from the earth’ and designating ‘an original or indigenous inhabitant of a place’
(Soanes and Stevenson, 2003: 107). ‘Autochthony’ can thus be deﬁned in a provi-
sional manner as referring to a proclaimed ‘original’ link between an individual,
territory and group, usually self-styling itself as profoundly ‘authentic’, ‘primor-
dial’, ‘natural’ and ‘self-evident’.1 In a literature review of the recent upsurge of
autochthony-based discourses in various countries in Africa and Europe, Bambi
Ceuppens and Peter Geschiere (2005) note that the intimately interrelated term
‘indigenous peoples’ has gained an even broader appeal, especially since the estab-
lishment of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in
1982. However, Ceuppens and Geschiere emphasize that ‘indigenous peoples’ are
usually conceived of as marginalized ‘others’ in need of protection in ‘their own
lands’, whereas the ‘autochthon’ is typically conceived of as an ‘in-group’ in need of
protection from scrounging strangers who have immigrated into and are threaten-
ing to take over ‘one’s own homeland’ (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005: 386). While
this bifurcation between autochthony and indigeneity might indeed occur in the
popular imagination, I will argue below that, analytically speaking, indigeneity
should be rather understood as constituting a particular version of autochthony.
From the early 1990s onwards, autochthony has emerged as an urgent and
violently contested issue in many African countries – a development that can be
interpreted as the rather unexpected corollary of democratization (especially
through reintroduced multiparty elections) and increasingly decentralized develop-
ment policies which sidestep the state (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005: 385, 389–90;
Geschiere, 2009: 17–21). As a central mode within the current politics of belonging,
arguably the ﬂip-side of globalization, discourses on autochthony take several
forms that diﬀer both within and between nation-states (Ceuppens and
Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006).
In Cameroon, for example, the reintroduction of multiparty elections has led to
an upsurge of autochthony amidst fears among locals of being ‘illegitimately’ out-
voted in ‘their’ areas by more numerous ‘strangers’ who are, in fact, often
co-citizens (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2000; Socpa, 2003). The ruling Biya
regime has fuelled and successfully instrumentalized such fears by supporting regio-
nal elite associations and introducing new laws protecting ‘true’ locals against
migrating co-citizens in order to split the political opposition (Geschiere, 2009:
39–65; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2000; Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003;
Nyamnjoh and Rowlands, 1998). In the forest areas of southeast Cameroon,
new decentralized development projects have recently bypassed the state, targeting
local ‘communities’ and thus also turning the question as to who can claim ‘true’
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autochthony there into a potentially lucrative issue (Geschiere, 2004, 2009: 66–96).
Ironically, Baka hunter-gatherers, who also live in this forest region and are locally
and internationally regarded as one of the world’s most ‘indigenous peoples’, seem
to be largely excluded from such beneﬁts since their relatively weak integration into
the nation-state prevents them from turning, as Alec Leonhardt (2006) puts it, their
merely ‘symbolic autochthony’ into proﬁtable ‘substantive autochthony’. I will
come back to this issue of success in claiming ‘indigeneity’ in the conclusion.
In Coˆte d’Ivoire, rather than providing an alternative identity to national citi-
zenship, autochthony has recently been used to redeﬁne the nation itself at a
smaller scale. Against the backdrop of long-standing southward labour migration
by both northern Ivorians and migrants from neighbouring Mali and Burkina
Faso, a southern bloc of various ethnic groups has established itself as the ‘true’
autochthonous nation under the notion of ivoirite´, which has been reinforced not
only in several legal provisions but also in violent clashes between diverse patriotic
movements, ‘self-defence’ groups and militias (Chauveau, 2000; Dozon, 2000;
Geschiere, 2009: 97–117; Marshall-Fratani, 2006). The strategic use of autochthony
at diﬀerent and varying scales is also highlighted in case studies of other parts of
Africa. As Stephen Jackson (2006) shows for eastern Zaire/Congo, autochthony
discourses have operated in that region on local, provincial, national and regional
levels within a highly ambiguous segmentary identity structure, which – through its
nervous and paranoid evocations – has led to much recent violence. In other
African regions, conﬂicts about ‘true’ autochthony seem to have primarily taken
place at the sub-national level. The west African savannah region of the Black
Volta, for instance, has a long history leading back into pre-colonial times of
contested land rights based on ﬁrst-comer claims among various ethnic groups.
These groups apparently agree that ﬁrst-comer claims provide a legitimate frame-
work in which to negotiate various forms of land rights. However, conﬂicts arise
not only because of incompatibilities between diverse historical narratives but also
due to diﬀerences in deﬁning the ‘pivotal historical event’ – ‘coming ﬁrst’ as either
discovering or as clearing/working the new land – and in delineating the territorial
and social reach of such ﬁrst-comer groups (Lentz, 2006a, 2006b).
Europe has also recently witnessed a noticeable expansion of autochthony dis-
courses. Against the background of accelerated immigration and globalization, the
political right has increasingly evoked a rhetoric of autochthonous exclusion in
countries such as Denmark, the UK, Austria, Italy, France, the Netherlands and
Belgium (Ceuppens, 2006: 150; Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005: 397; Geschiere,
2009: 130–68; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006: 3; Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2000:
440). In Belgian Flanders, the radical right-wing Flemish-nationalist party
Vlaams Belang (VB) has been quite successful by ambiguously advocating the
exclusion of allochthons at two diﬀerent levels: on the one hand, VB has repre-
sented Francophone co-citizens from Wallonia and elsewhere in Belgium as ‘stran-
gers’ and enemies within when propagating a rhetoric of Flemish separatism. On
the other hand, VB has also denounced immigrants (most notably of Muslim
descent) as scrounging allochthons within a pan-Belgian rhetoric of welfare
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chauvinism, which reserves state welfare beneﬁts to Flemish and Walloon autoch-
thons alike (Ceuppens, 2006; Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005: 397–402).
As this fascinating new body of literature on Africa and Europe shows, auto-
chthony is thus used as a means of specifying with regard to the state both which
level within a segmentary identity structure is relevant in a given context and
which identity deﬁnition at that given level is appropriate. In some contexts – like
in Cameroon, along the Black Volta, within local, provincial and regional iden-
tiﬁcations rooted in eastern Congo as well as in the Flemish separatist discourse –
autochthony thereby functions as an alternative to national citizenship. In other
contexts – such as in Coˆte d’Ivoire, within national identiﬁcations in eastern
Congo as well as in the pan-Belgian discourse targeting Muslim immigrants –
autochthony operates rather as a redeﬁnition of national citizenship (see
Geschiere, 2009: 26).
This new ethnography is thus explicitly concerned with the relationship between
autochthony and other forms of belonging such as ethnicity, nationality and citi-
zenship. However, it is interesting to note that, within these texts, this relationship
is typically engaged empirically rather than conceptually.2 The authors generally
use terms such as ‘ethnic groups’, ‘national citizenship’ or ‘the nation’ as conven-
tional tags for speciﬁc levels within the segmentary identity structure without
explicitly addressing the question as to what analytically distinguishes these various
modes of belonging.3 In instances in which autochthony is actually deﬁned in some
way, this is typically done ambiguously through a characterization of autochthony,
on the one hand, as ‘a new form of ethnicity’ equally capable of ‘creating an us–
them opposition’ and ‘arousing strong emotions regarding the defense of home and
of ancestral lands’ (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2000: 424; see also Ceuppens, 2006:
151; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006: 5–6). On the other hand, however, autochthony
is also represented as diﬀerent from ethnicity (Ceuppens, 2006: 149; Geschiere and
Jackson, 2006: 5–6) as the latter notion ‘evokes the existence of a more or less
clearly deﬁned ethnic group with its own substance and a speciﬁc name and his-
tory’, whereas autochthony is ‘less speciﬁc’ (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2000: 424),
‘empty’ (Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005: 387; Geschiere, 2009: 28) and ‘contentless’
(Jackson, 2006: 100): ‘an identity with no particular name and no speciﬁed history,
only expressing the claim to have come ﬁrst, which is always open to contest’
(Ceuppens and Geschiere, 2005: 387; see also Geschiere, 2009: 225 n. 2).
These deﬁnitions by Geschiere and other authors seemingly suggest that auto-
chthony should ultimately be treated as distinct from ethnicity. But when having a
second look at the discussed empirical cases from Africa and Europe, it becomes
evident, ﬁrst, that almost all described ‘autochthonous’ identities below the level of
(nation-)states in fact do refer to named ethnic groups, which not only have speciﬁ-
able histories but actually do specify them (among others) through claims of having
been the ﬁrst to arrive in ‘their own territory’. Second, even when the nation and its
citizenry are redeﬁned through autochthony at the state-level, this smaller-scale
re-conception is usually ‘ethnic’ rather than ‘civic’ in nature. As a matter of fact,
substituting ‘civic’ citizenship by a more restrictive ‘ethnic’ citizenship is typically
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the very raison d’etre behind the evocation of a rhetoric of autochthony in the ﬁrst
place. This suggests that, despite occasionally claiming the contrary, within this
new ethnography of autochthony it is usually the ‘ethnic’ that legitimizes privileged
access to land (and other territorialized resources) through autochthonous ﬁrst-
comer claims rooted in the past.
When comparing these observations from the new research on autochthony with
the civic–ethnic distinction within studies of nationalism, it is evident that – some-
what ironically – both literatures provide rather contradictory accounts as to how
identity formations of individuals and groups literally ‘take place’: in studies of
nationalism, it is typically the ‘non-ethnic’, that is, the ‘civic’, that is associated with
territory through place of birth and/or residence (the ‘ethnic’ being mainly linked
to descent and/or culture). By contrast, within the recent ethnography of auto-
chthony, it is generally the ‘ethnic’ that interlinks an individual, territory and group
in such an allegedly ‘original’ way that land rights follow from ﬁrst-comer claims
linked to a ‘pivotal event’ in the past.
Towards a new synthesis: Autochthony as the causal logic
behind ethnicity
Against the backdrop of this critical discussion, I suggest a synthesis of insights
derived from both ﬁelds of research by conceptualizing the causal logic that prin-
cipally underlies the (re)production of ethnicity in terms of ‘autochthony’.
Conceived of in this way, ‘autochthony’ can be described as a triad in which its
three elements – ‘individual’, ‘territory’ and ‘group’ – are causally linked through
the interconnections of place of birth/residence, group membership with land(ed)
rights (that is, both rights in land and rights, the validity of which is territorially
circumscribed) and shared culture/descent, while thereby being simultaneously sit-
uated in time. Within such an approach, the apparent inconsistencies between
studies of nationalism and studies of autochthony can be reinterpreted as being
complementary in addressing two alternative modes of this very same causal logic:
these ideal-typical modes diﬀer only with regard to their respective causal direc-
tions as well as the way in which they honour time.
‘Civic’ nationalism can hence be interpreted as being based on ‘individualized
autochthony’ in which an individual – through his or her place of birth and/or
residence – ﬁrst causally links up with a territory, which – through land(ed)
rights embedded in membership titles – is connected to a group, which, in turn,
is likely to link up again with the individual through the possible though not nec-
essary connection of a shared culture and/or descent. This ideal-type of auto-
chthony is ‘individualized’ in the sense that the proclaimed original link between
an individual, territory and group is essentially produced through the presence of
individuals, that is, through their individual place of birth and/or residence in their
respective ‘presents’. Commonality of place of birth and/or residence thereby
simultaneously connects to and constitutes both ‘the territory’ at issue and, then,
‘the group’. Over time, this pattern is likely eventually also to cause commonalities
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of culture and/or descent among these individuals unless, of course, these individ-
uals migrate or they are the oﬀspring of migrant parents.
Conversely, cases usually characterized in terms of ‘ethnic’ nationalism or, in
fact, ‘autochthony’4 can be described as being based on another autochthonous
mode that inverts the causal direction of individualized autochthony: within
‘collectivized autochthony’, an individual – through shared culture and/or descent
– ﬁrst causally links up with a group, which at some point in its proclaimed past
connected itself – through the establishment of land(ed) rights for its members – to
a territory, which now in the present is likely to link up again with the individual
through the possible though not necessary connection of placing the birth and/or
residence of this individual within its own conﬁnes. This mode of autochthony is
‘collectivized’ since the proclaimed original link between an individual, territory
and group is essentially established through the past of groups, distinguishing
between ‘earlier-comers’ and ‘later-comers’ to that territory based on alleged
‘collective pasts’.5 Shared culture and/or descent serve as the necessary link for
an individual to be connected, ﬁrst, to the group and then to the territory, but
group, territory and their interconnection are conceived of as being independent
from and prior to the individual. In many cases, this nexus is likely ultimately also
to cause the individual to be born and/or to reside within the territory to which his
or her community of culture and/or descent proclaims entitlement. Yet this is not
necessarily so, as the prototypical case of diasporas demonstrates.
Within this new model of ethnicity based on the causal logic of autochthony, the
suggested ideal-typical distinction between individualized and collectivized auto-
chthony can be used to explain why ‘place of birth and/or residence’ and ‘shared
culture and/or descent’ are often ambiguously coupled together within discussions
of civic and ethnic nationalisms, even though there is no obvious reason for doing
so, especially with regard to ‘shared culture and/or descent’. Against the back-
ground of this analytical model, however, these couplings do make sense since
‘place of birth’ and ‘place of residence’ are truly interchangeable when it comes
to evoking the individualized-autochthonous logic behind ethnicity, while ‘shared
culture’ and ‘shared descent’ equally actuate the very same logic of collectivized
autochthony.
Another ambiguity built into the civic–ethnic divide can also be avoided by
using this model of autochthony: on the one hand, the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ are
typically distinguished by diﬀerent ingredients. As the above quote from Smith
indicates, the ‘civic’ is typically a ‘territorial conception’, while the ‘ethnic’ rather
emphasizes the ‘community of birth and native culture’ (Smith, 1991: 9, 11). Yet,
only a few pages later in the same text, Smith (1991: 13–14) insists that both models
also share ‘certain common beliefs about what constitutes a nation’, and goes on to
enumerate these deﬁning ingredients in a way that largely conﬂates the earlier
distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nations.6 This ambiguity is dissolved
within the dichotomy of individualized and collectivized autochthony since this
distinction is not based on diﬀerent ingredients but on diﬀerent causal directions
in which the same elements are prototypically linked: individualized autochthony
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sees shared culture and/or descent as likely consequences following from place of
birth and/or residence, while collectivized autochthony inverts this causality. In
other words, no less than collectivized autochthons do individualized autochthons
prototypically envision a shared culture and/or shared descent within the territory
of the ethnic group. Both only diﬀer in the causal logic they utilize to explain this
coincidence. While shared culture and/or descent are the independent variables –
the prerequisite of ethnicity – for the collectivized autochthon, they are the likely
but not necessary outcomes for the individualized autochthon. This also means,
however, that for both conceptions, shared culture and/or descent are not simply
given but are instead either the independent causes of the ethnic group (in collec-
tivized autochthony) or merely potential eﬀects about which one can never be sure
(in individualized autochthony). This turns an ethnicist revival aiming for ‘cultural
renewal’ and/or ‘genealogical restoration’ into a potential necessity for both the
collectivized and individualized autochthon, thus constituting a crucial diﬀerence
between this model of ethnicity based on autochthony and the classical civic–ethnic
divide: for the textbook ‘civic nationalist’, shared culture and/or descent are truly
negligible, whereas for the ideal-typical ‘individualized autochthon’, they are not
only likely but actually also desirable within his or her quest to come closer to a
prototypical ethnicity that – to spin further the metaphorical language of the model
– ideally consists of a ‘closed causal triangle’. The inverse point can, of course, also
be made concerning the potential necessity for both the collectivized and individ-
ualized autochthon of an ethnicist revival aiming at a restored ‘territorial integra-
tion’ that safeguards the ‘place of birth and/or residence’ of ethnic group members
against intrusions from outsiders.7
This focus on diﬀerent causal directions rather than diﬀerent ingredients further
permits an explanation of how the autochthonous logic evoked by actors as under-
lying a particular ethnic identity may easily and abruptly change without any
necessary changes in its actual ingredients, namely, when actors begin to inverse
the causal direction that allegedly explains the existence of that identity. This also
implies that for one and the same ethnic identity, opposed causal logics – that is,
individualized- and collectivized-autochthonous variants – may coexist at the same
time. This is so because for prototypical members of an ethnic group both the
individualized and collectivized logic of autochthony typically lead to the very
same ethnic triad. It is only in the case of ‘classiﬁcatory anomalies’ – that is,
immigrants and their oﬀspring as well as diasporas – that the underlying mode
of autochthony truly matters as it ideal-typically causes either inclusion or exclu-
sion of these actors into the ethnicity at issue.
Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that the ideal-typical distinction
between individualized and collectivized autochthony allows for numerous empir-
ical variations that result from issues of scale, content as well as divergent combi-
nations of deﬁning elements. Apart from simply drawing territorial boundaries
diﬀerently, individual autochthons can diﬀer, for instance, concerning the spatial
scale that they apply respectively: is the group envisioned to conﬁne its ‘place of
birth and/or residence’ to a rather small locale, a region, a ‘country’, a continent,
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the world or any territorial conﬁguration in between? Variabilities in the actual
content of cultural and/or descent-related criteria used for deﬁning speciﬁc collec-
tivized autochthonies also lead to divergent scenarios. Yet scale does play a role
here as well, since one and the same cultural marker such as ‘our language’ can be
evoked at the level of a dialect, a ‘national’ language, a language family, etc. The
same applies to descent-based criteria. Finally it is important to highlight that
many empirical cases of ethnicity combine elements from both individualized
and collectivized autochthony in their self-deﬁnitions. Within one and the same
group, members may also use quite divergent individualized- and/or collectivized-
autochthonous elements in their attempts to come to terms with their sense of
identity (as was just argued in the preceding paragraph), and these deﬁnitions
may change over time. Many legislations on ‘citizenship’ – itself arguably nothing
but the state-sanctioned form of autochthony, that is, state autochthony – combine
the logics of both individualized and collectivized autochthony in speciﬁc ways.
That such variations, internal contradictions and changes over time in the autoch-
thonous deﬁnitions of an ethnic group do not hinder it from continuing to exist
over time – in other words: that an essentialist deﬁnition is not a prerequisite for
ethnicity – is a point that Fredrik Barth (1969) championed long ago.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that claims to such autochthonous eth-
nicities are always embedded in speciﬁc historical, political and cultural contexts, in
which the institutional arrangements of ‘the state’ ﬁgure prominently. As my above
discussion of empirical cases from Africa and Europe shows, the speciﬁcities of
states in their increasingly transnationalized frames of reference crucially inﬂuence
the ways, in which the politics of autochthonous belonging plays itself out: the kind
of statehood (liberal-democratic, totalitarian, etc.), the presence and type of an
electoral system, the extent of decentralization and relative autonomy of sub-
regions, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, the prominence of economic asymme-
tries, ﬂows of intrastate and transnational (im)migrants as well as the extent to
which the state and its resources remain accessible to its citizenry all profoundly
prestructure the ﬁeld in which claims to autochthonous ethnicity emerge and
become meaningful.
State institutions thereby need to be seen in the context of path-dependent his-
tories of layered arrangements that potentially survive from pre-colonial, colonial
and postcolonial times, both in popular memory and in the set-up of the institu-
tions themselves.8 However, not only the evolved nature of actual state institutions
but also purely imagined and aspired to forms of statehood play their part. In other
words, the multilayered politics of autochthonous belonging takes place with
regard to evolving dynamics between images and practices of statehood (Migdal
and Schlichte, 2005). This draws attention to the fact that actual states vary in their
capacities to enact in practice the promises entailed in the globalized ideal or image
of modern statehood, as highlighted in the somewhat misleading debate on ‘failed
states’: to what extent is a single state capable of establishing itself with suﬃcient
credibility regarding its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within its
entire territory, while simultaneously providing and maintaining a civic culture
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that suﬃciently integrates its citizenry en masse? Cases such as the collapsed state of
Somalia, where secessionist Somaliland has revitalized the borders of the former
British Protectorate, while neighbouring Puntland has activated a discourse of
regionalism within an aspired to federal Somalia all against the backdrop of intense
antagonisms within a segmentary clan structure (Hoehne, 2009), powerfully illus-
trate, how the politics of autochthonous ethnicities is profoundly shaped by sur-
rounding state dynamics. However, the state is not only a crucial context for the
politics of autochthonous belonging, but can also itself become the core target of
such ethnic processes. Turning to this important issue will ﬁnally allow me to
combine my theoretical interrogations of various identity-related concepts in
anthropology with a political discussion of the alleged fallacies of ‘indigeneity’.
Conclusion: Indigeneity and nationalism as
alternative modes for targeting the state
I began this article by brieﬂy summarizing the recent ‘indigenous peoples’ debate
stirred by Kuper’s rejection of the notion of ‘indigeneity’, using this discussion as a
springboard for exploring the theoretical interrelations between various identity-
related notions. Against the backdrop of correlating some apparently contradic-
tory arguments within studies of nationalism, on the one hand, and the recent
ethnography of autochthony, on the other, I proposed a model of ethnicity that
is principally based on the causal logic of autochthony. This autochthonous eth-
nicity knows of two ideal-typical logics that get combined in various and divergent
ways in concrete cases, namely individualized and collectivized autochthony. As I
showed, ethnicities based on such autochthonous conceptions need not be essen-
tialist, even in cases of collectivized autochthony, where individuals, through
notions of shared culture and/or descent, link up with a group which, at some
point in its proclaimed past, connected itself to a territory through the establish-
ment of land(ed) rights for its members.
Widely accepted working deﬁnitions of the term ‘indigenous people’ within the
international discourse of politics, law and (at least partly) anthropology empha-
size four criteria, namely ﬁrst-comer, non-dominance, cultural diﬀerence and self-
ascription (Saugestad, 2001: 43). These deﬁnitions reveal ‘indigeneity’ to be a
variant of collectivized-autochthonous ethnicity that has been marginalized by
dominating later-comers aligning with, and often running, the state, in which
this discrimination has taken place. Indigenous people who successfully establish
their ‘indigeneity’ hence manage to secure special entitlements from ‘their’ state in
compensation for discriminations that have been committed against them as ear-
lier-comers by later-comers under the auspices of that very state. This success
requires representatives of such indigenous peoples to be suﬃciently conversant in
the language of human rights and entitlements that is used and understood within
modern state structures, and many indigenous people (like the above-mentioned
Baka) lack this necessary degree of integration into the state. Becoming more
conversant in this westernized culture, however, typically comes with the cost of
13
losing ‘cultural distinctiveness’ which, in turn, is often expected to be proven in
order to substantiate claims to indigeneity in the ﬁrst place (Thuen, 2006: 24; see
also Robins, 2001). Hence, ‘cultural distinctiveness’ or, even worse, continuity
with ‘primitive society’ should be abandoned as a condition sine qua non for
‘indigeneity’; then, as members of a group of earlier-comers with a distinctive
collectivized-autochthonous ethnicity (based on variable and possibly changing
deﬁnitions), which has been marginalized by later-comers within a state structure,
such people stand a fair chance of beneﬁting from their acknowledged
‘indigeneity’.9
Concrete cases of claims to such indigeneity require, of course, authentication by
experts. Anthropologists and other social scientists will be, and evidently have
been, heavily involved in scrutinizing to what an extent claims for compensation
are legitimately based on membership in a collectivized-autochthonous ethnic
group that has persisted (based on whatever possible criteria) from a time of
state-supported marginalization by later-comers. Like all theoretical concepts
that also have a political life beyond the academy, ‘indigeneity’ thereby also con-
stitutes a resource that oﬀers itself to manipulation, leaving experts in a diﬃcult
position, in which the boundary between authentication and advocacy becomes
blurred and diﬃcult to draw. Yet besides the fact that it seems diﬃcult to maintain
a critical distance from any form of colonialism without at least an implicit
notion of ‘indigeneity’, it is consoling that Kuper’s propagated alternative – the
common good enshrined in individual rights of citizens – hardly escapes these
conundrums, but merely mistakes (at best) ‘actually existing’ liberalism for the
ideals of liberalism.
In sum: two of the three objections by Kuper against the notion of ‘indigenous
peoples’ as mentioned in the introduction crumble, since ‘indigeneity’ needs neither
to be based on obsolete anthropological notions of ‘primitive society’ and essen-
tializations of culture nor to necessarily make use of descent as its deﬁning princi-
ple. But what about the third objection just alluded to in the last paragraph: that
the rhetoric of indigeneity creates new divisions and is less likely to promote the
common good than are policies evoking individual rights of citizens within liberal-
democratic states? It should not be forgotten that individual rights granted with
citizenship do not actually escape but, to the contrary, themselves instantiate auto-
chthony merely in a diﬀerent variety than indigeneity, namely in the form of state
autochthony. State autochthony equally draws on the criteria of place of birth,
place of residence, shared descent and/or shared culture in variable ways
(Kenrick and Lewis, 2004: 4) and thereby creates various and divergent boundaries
between those who are possibly to beneﬁt as ‘citizens’ and those who are not.
Nationalism arguably denotes the ongoing or already successful attempt by
autochthonous groups to usurp the very entitlement of the state itself, thereby
often turning their own autochthonous self-deﬁnition into oﬃcial state auto-
chthony. Ironically, it is precisely this process of promoting the ‘common good’
for citizens thus deﬁned in biased terms of the nationalist majority that typically
has been at the root of discriminations against indigenous peoples in the ﬁrst place.
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Thus Kuper is right in that the rhetoric of indigeneity creates new divisions; yet that
is precisely the point.
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Notes
1. This apparent ‘immediateness’ has been variously noted, for instance by Jean Comaroff
and John L. Comaroff (2001: 648, 649, 651), who characterize autochthony as ‘a natu-
ralizing allegory of collective being-in-the-world’, which – in self-styling itself as ‘the most
‘authentic’, the most essential of all modes of connection’ – ‘natures the nation’. Bambi
Ceuppens and Peter Geschiere (2005: 385, 402) highlight the ‘apparently self-evident’
nature and ‘naturalness’ of autochthony claims, while Geschiere and Stephen Jackson
(2006: 6) speak of autochthony as allegedly based ‘on some sort of primordial truth-claim
about belonging to the land’. Finally, Geschiere (2009: 2) emphasizes that autochthony
‘seems to represent the most authentic form of belonging’.
2. Geschiere (2009: 5) formulates this approach as an explicit research strategy when stating
that ‘it would be counterproductive to work from a strict definition of this quite enig-
matic notion [i.e. autochthony]. My intention is rather to try to follow what meanings and
associations people in strongly different situations attach to it, and how it can retain its
apparent self-evidence and thus its plausibility in such different contexts.’
3. Jackson (2006: 100–9) is most explicit in this regard when he equates ‘ethnicity’ with the
local, ‘nationality’ with the national [sic] (i.e. with the state) and ‘megaethnicity’ with the
regional level.
4. Within the recent literature, the empirical cases discussed under the label ‘autochthony’
invariably fall only into this second type. However, there are passages within this body
of texts that already point to the necessity, or at least the possibility, of distinguishing
between two opposed modes of autochthony. For instance, Geschiere and Francis B.
Nyamnjoh (2000: 442) observe how (this mode of) autochthony typically fetishizes
the collective at the expense of the individual without realizing, however, that this
situation could also be the inverse. Similarly, Geschiere and Jackson (2006: 7) note
as ‘an interesting catch’ that autochthony literally means ‘from the soil itself’, while
most present-day autochthony movements claim to be first-comers, which implies a
movement in the past. Yet the authors fail to acknowledge that this catch might indi-
cate that one cannot only be ‘from the soil itself’ through a past movement of one’s
own group but also through one’s own individual birth ‘from’ and/or residence within
the present territory.
5. The new ethnography of autochthony usually insists that the contested pasts of groups
are typically discussed in terms of which group has ‘come first’ and what this ‘pivotal
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historical event’ of ‘coming first’ actually means, namely, possession through discovery or
labour (for example, Lentz, 2006b: 48–52). However, even though in many cases of col-
lectivized autochthony these contests about first-comer claims surely prevail, they are not
necessarily the only option for this autochthonous mode to be operative. In other words,
collectivized autochthony is based on the claim that, in the past of one’s own group, a
pivotal event such as discovery or labour (or conquest) turned the group and its future
members into the legitimate ‘owners’ of the land, either because the group was (allegedly)
first, because the group was (allegedly) there before rival groups (yet after irrelevant
others) or because the group has been there for a sufficient length of time to be on an
equal footing with even more ‘autochthonous’ groups. The first case refers to the typical
‘first-comer’ situation. The second case solves the apparent paradox mentioned by some
observers (for example, Jackson, 2006: 113), in which several groups claim to have arrived
before some other rival group but after another first-comer group (like Pygmies) that is
usually so marginalized and so different in terms of social, political and economic orga-
nization as not to constitute any serious challenge within state politics (see also
Leonhardt, 2006). (In fact, this second case harks back to the issue of success of ‘indig-
enous’ movements in accessing state resources, which will be addressed in the conclusion.)
The third case applies for instance to Northern Irish Protestants, who stress their later-
comer status as descendants of Scottish and English settlers during the 17th-century
Plantations, while simultaneously arguing that they have lived in the region long
enough to claim legitimate self-determination. A similar case consists of descendants of
colonial settler communities such as white Afrikaners in South Africa.
6. Smith (1991: 14) defines the nation as ‘a named human population sharing an historic
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common
economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. Apart from ‘shared
descent’, which is ambiguously left out, all nations – ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ – thus seem to
share, among other things, a territory, land(ed) rights and a culture.
7. According to Smith (1986: 51), ethnicist movements have typically focused on precisely
these three elements: ‘cultural renewal’, ‘genealogical restoration’ and/or ‘territorial
integration’.
8. For instance, in many pre-modern states in central and east Africa, Oceania and the
Americas, a political culture of ‘stranger-kings’ prevailed, as described by Marshall
Sahlins (1981: 111–12) for Polynesia in the following way: ‘It is a remarkably
common fact that the great chiefs and kings of political society [in such states] are
not of the people they rule. By the local theories of origin they are strangers, just as the
draconian feats by which they come to power are foreign to the conduct of the ‘‘real
people’’ or ‘‘true sons of the land’’, as Polynesians might express it. [. . .] Typically, then,
these rulers do not even spring from the same clay as the aboriginal people: they are
from the heavens or – in the very common case – they are of distinct ethnic stock. In
either event, royalty is the foreigner.’ I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers
for drawing my attention to this specific institutional set-up, which apparently invokes
the autochthonous logic of ethnicity for a double purpose: in order to determine, by
means of inclusion, the socio-territorial body politic and, by means of exclusion, the
category of its potential rulers.
9. Using the example of the Mbororo in Cameroon, Michaela Pelican (2009) aptly shows
which complexities emerge when the criterion of ‘earlier-coming’ is given up in the def-
inition of ‘indigenous peoples’.
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